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Abstract. Directed signature scheme is applicable when the signed message contains 
information sensitive to the receiver, because only receiver can directly verify the signature and 
that he/she can prove its validity to any third party, whenever necessary. 
This paper presents two applications of directed signature scheme. (i) Directed –Delegated 
Signature Scheme. This scheme combines the idea of proxy signatures with directed signature 
scheme. (ii) Allocation of registration number. This scheme proposes a registration scheme in 
which the registration number cannot be forged and misused. 
1. Introduction 
The most important part of a message is the signature of the sender. Usually written signature is hard 
to duplicate. Therefore this is a natural tool to authenticate the communication. Since physical signature 
is meaningless in electronic messages; one has to rely on other methods like digital signature. 
Public key cryptography discovered by W. Diffie and M. Hellman [6] in 1976 has revolutionized the 
ways of message communications through insecure media. It is now possible for the people who have 
never met before to communicate with one another in a secure and authenticate way over an open and 
insecure network such as Internet. Thus there is a growing use of public key techniques in cryptographic 
applications. In particular, digital signature scheme using public key techniques is one of the most 
important cryptographic tools, which is essential in implementing various security measures and 
authentication.  
Digital signature scheme allows a user with a public key and a corresponding private key to 
sign a document in such a way that everyone can verify the signature on the document (using 
her/his public key), but no one else can forge the signature on another document. This self-
authentication is required for some applications of digital signatures such as certification, by 
some authority. In many situations, signed message is sensitive to the signature receiver. 
Signatures on medical records, tax information and most personal/business transactions are such 
situations. Consider when a user A wants to generate a signature on a message m, sensitive for 
B and the message is also of concern to other users. For this situation, the form of the signature 
 2 
should be such that only B can directly verify the signature and that B can prove its validity to 
any third party C, whenever necessary. Such signatures are called directed signatures [4, 5, 8, 
9, 12]. In directed signature scheme, the signature receiver B has full control over the signature 
verification process. Nobody can check the validity of signature without his cooperation.  
The concept of directed signatures was first presented by C.H.Lim and P.J. Lee [8]. It is a 
construction based on the GQ signature scheme [7]. D.Chaum [4] introduced the concept of designated 
confirmation. Later T. Okamoto [12] presented a more practical construction of designated confirmer 
signatures. 
This paper presents two applications of directed signature scheme. The paper is organized as follows:- 
The section-2 presents some basic tools. Section-3 describes a Directed –Delegated Signature 
Scheme. An application to Allocation of registration number  is discussed in section-4. 
2. Preliminaries        
2.1. Throughout this paper we will use the following system setting.  
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 <  p  < 2 512 ; 
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 <  q  < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p – 1; 
• A number g, where   g      k (p –1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1  k  p –1 such that g 
>1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp*
 
). 
• A collision free one-way hash function h [17]; 
The parameters p, q, g and h are common to all users. We assume that every user A chooses a 
random Ax ∈ Zq and computes  Ay  = Αxg   mod p .Here Ax  is the private key of A and Ay  is the public 
key of A. For our purpose, we use the directed signature scheme based on Schnorr’s signature scheme 
[14]. These basic tools are briefly described below:- 
2.2. Schnorr’s signature scheme 
In this scheme, the signature of A on message m are given by ( Ar , AS ), where,   
Ar     =      h (g Ak  mod p, m),    and     AS   =    Ak  − Ax . Ar  mod  p. 
     Here random Ak ∈ Zq   is private to A .The signature are verified by checking the equality    
             Ar   =   h  ( g AS    y Ar  mod p , m ) . 
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2.3. Directed signature scheme 
 Suppose that user A wants to generate a signature on message m so that only the receiver B can 
verify the signature and that B can prove the validity of signature to any third party C, whenever 
necessary. This scheme consists of the following steps. 
2.3.1. Signature generation by A to B 
  (a).  A picks at random 
1a
K and 
2a
K  ∈  Zq and computes   
                                     WB       =       g  1aK 2aK−    mod p ,     and  ZB           =        By 1a
K
 mod p. 
              (b). Using a one-way hash function h, A computes Ar   =   h (ZB  , WB ,  m), and then 
                                                                                  AS         =     2aK − Ax . Ar  mod q. 
                            { AS  , WB , Ar , m} is the signature of A on m. 
2.3.2. Signature verification by B 
(a). B computes  µ   =    [g AS  ( Ay ) Ar WB] mod p,   and      ZB       =      µ  Bx  mod p. 
(b) B computes h (ZB  , WB ,  m)  and checks the validity of signature by equality       
                                   Ar    =       h (ZB  , WB ,  m)mod q. 
2.3.3. Proof of validity by B to any third party C 
(a) B sends   to { AS  , WB , Ar , m, µ} to C. 
(b) C checks if   Ar   =   h (ZB  , WB ,  m)mod q. 
        If this does not hold C stops the process; otherwise goes to the next steps. 
(c)  B in a zero knowledge fashion proves to C that logµ ZB    =   log g By  as follows:- 
• C chooses random u, v ∈ Zp computes w  =   µ u . g v mod p, and sends w to B. 
• B chooses random  ∈ Zp computes   =    w. g α mod p, and   γ  =    Bx  mod p,                                         
and sends , γ   to C. 
• C sends u, v to B, by which B can verify that  w  =   µ u . g v mod p. 
• B sends  to C, by which she can verify that            
              =     µ u . g v +α mod p,     and       γ       =          ZB u  yC v +α  mod p. 
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3. Directed Delegated Signature Scheme 
This section combines the idea of proxy signature scheme [10, 16] with directed signature scheme 
and obtains a Directed-delegated signature scheme. In this application of directed signature scheme, the 
signing of message is done in two phases. The first phase is off-line. This phase is governed by proxy 
signature scheme, and can be performed even before the message to be signed is known. The second 
phase is on-line. It starts after the message becomes known and utilizes the precomputation of the first 
phase.  
 Delegation of rights is a common practice in the real world. In the electronic world to facilitate this 
requirement, proxy signature scheme have been invented to delegate signing capability efficiently and 
transparently. Digital signature schemes rely on a secret signature key [1], which only the certified person 
knows. If this secret key is delegated to another person directly, it can no longer be identified with that 
person and hence the assumption of the digital signature is broken. We therefore need to delegate the 
signing capability without revealing the secret key such that the recipient can verify the signature of the 
original signer with the help of proxy signer. 
This section proposes an application of directed-delegated signature scheme. In this scheme, CMO is 
a central authority, who designates a trusted authority B to issue certificate on his behalf. The contents of 
the certificate are message, which is sensitive for a patient C and is also of concern to other users. C wants 
a certificate that nobody can check the validity of signature without his help, but C can prove the validity 
of the signature to any third party Yamu, whenever necessary.  
Consider a situation, there is a NGO’s hospital which facilitate AIDS checkup. The hospital is headed 
by a CMO A, who has many responsibilities to perform. He designates a trusted colleague B to issue 
certificate on his behalf. A patient C does not want to disclose the result of his/her check-up and he/she 
want a certificate that nobody can read without his help.  Unfortunately if C is HIV positive then there is 
need of curing. For treatment there is another important hospital headed by a NGO chief Yamu, Y, Where 
all types of Medicine, remedies and all resources are available for AIDS patients C. For treatment there, C 
has to prove the validity of a certificate to a desired person (Yamu) only. 
The one solution of such problems is governed by directed signature schemes. Here the receiver C 
can directly verify the signature and that C can prove its validity to any third party Yamu, whenever 
necessary. Since directed signature can be verified with the help of receiver C only so we can say that the 
contents of certificates have no validity without the signature verification.  
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 The following is an exposition on how proxy and directed signature scheme can be implemented for 
our construction. 
3.1 Application of directed-delegated signature scheme 
Before organizing the check up, A appoints B as a designated signer. He delivers a designated 
signature key to B using the following protocol. 
3.1.1. Signature key delegation by A 
     1.A selects Ak ∈ Zq computes rA    =   g A
k
 mod p and sends rA to  B. 
     2. (a).B randomly selects  ∈ Zq and computes r   =
      
g rA  mod p. 
         (b) If   r ∈ Zq*, he sends r to A, otherwise goes to step (a) 
     3. A computes   sA       =      r xA  +   Ak  mod q and forwards sA to  B. 
     4. B   computes S       =
         
sA +      mod q and check if    g S       =        y r  r mod p 
         If equality holds, B accepts ‘sA’ as a valid designated signature key from A. Now the hospital is 
open for the public. B does the check up of a patient C and make the message m. B gives a certificate with 
message m to C. The signature generation and verification is done by the following protocol. 
3.1.2. Signature generation by B for C 
(a) B picks at random 
1bK and 2bK  ∈  Zq and computes   
                                          WB =  g 21 bb KK −  mod p  and Zc  =      yC 1b
K mod p.            
(b)  B computes  Br   =    h (Zc, WB, m)    and BS   =     2bK − S . rB mod q.  
(c)  B sends to C { BS , WB , Br , m }  as CMO signature. 
3.1.3. Signature verification by C 
(a) C computes µ  =  ( g BS  ( Ay  r.  r) Br WB ) mod p and Zc        =    µ Cx  mod p . 
(b)  C checks that 
  Br  =    h (Zc ,WB, m)  , for the validity of signature. 
3.1.4. Proof of validity by C to Y 
  This is done using the protocol discussed in the section- 2.3.3. 
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3.2. Security discussions 
This signature scheme is secure if existential forgery (providing a new message –signature pair) is 
computationally infeasible. In this section, we discuss some possible attacks.  
(a).  If the designated proxy signer B is dishonest then he can cheat  the original  signer A and get  her/his 
signature ( r , sA  ) on any message m  of her/his choice. 
The solution of this problem is the existence of a trusted third party. The original signer A may stress 
that all messages between two parties A and B during the key delegation protocol be authenticated. The 
third party keeps the records of original signer’s orders, and checks any case of designated signer 
disobeying original signer’s order. 
(b). Can one get integer 
2bK  and S (secret signature key of proxy signer) , from the equation 
                                    BS   =    2bK − S . rB mod q ? 
  Here the numbers of unknown parameters are two. The number of equation is one, so it is 
computationally infeasible for a forger to collect the secret integer 
2bK  and S .   
(c). Can one impersonate the designated signer B ? 
A forger may try to impersonate the designated signer B  by randomly selecting  two integers 
1i
K and 
2i
K  ∈  Zq .But without knowing the secret part  ,  it is difficult to generate a valid  proxy 
signature key  S  and BS to satisfy the verification equation,                                                                          
Zc
    
=  ( g BS  ( Ay  r.  r) Br WB )  Cx  mod p ,   Br     =     h (Zc, WB, m). 
(d). Can one forge a signature { BS , WB , Br , m, r} using the equation, 
µ    =   ( g BS  ( Ay  r.  r) Br WB ) mod p ? 
To compute the integer BS from this equation is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm 
problem. If any forger randomly selects *S  and sends { *S , WB , Br , m, r } to B, the receiver B 
computes 
µ*      =   [  g
*S ( Gy ) R    W ]  mod p,   Z*       =     µ* Bx  mod p. 
    and can check if    Br   =    h (Z*  ,WB, m),  to detect the forgery. 
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3.3. Illustration 
We illustrate the above scheme using small parameters. Taking p =  23, q = 11 ,g = 6 and the secret 
keys and the public keys of users are as follows. 
   Users                                     Secret key                         public key 
     A                                         3                   9 
     B                                       5                               2 
     C                                           6                                    12 
     Y                                            8                                    18 
3.3.1. B is appointed as a proxy signer by  A 
             1.  A   selects   kA  =  7 and sends    rA   =   3  to B. 
              2.  B   selects      =  5 and sends     r  =   6 to A. 
       3.  A computes   sA  =  3   and sends to   B. 
              4.  B computes proxy signature key s  =  8 and checks if  6 8   = [(9 6 .6)] Mod23. 
3.3.2. Signature generation by B for C 
             (a)    B picks at random 
1bK  =   7,  2bK  =   2 and calculate WB   =  2 and  Zc  = 16 . 
             (b)     B computes   Br   =  h (16 ,2,0,8,3,18)  =  2. 
              (c)      B computes  BS  =   8, and sends {2,2,8,0,8,3,18,6} to C. 
3.3.3. Signature verification by C 
                    (a)  C  computes   =  3  and  ZC   =   16.  
                    (b) C checks  Br    =      h (16 ,2,0,8,3,18)  =    2 , for the validity of signature. 
3.3.4. Proof of validity by C to Y 
                     (a)  C sends (16,2,2,8,3,0,8,3,18,3) to Y. 
                     (b)  Y checks   Br     =    h (16,2,0,8,3,18)  =  2 , 
                           If this does not hold stops the process; otherwise goes to next step.  
               (c)  Now C can prove that log 3 16   =   log 6 12, in a zero knowledge fashion by using    the 
following confirmation protocol. 
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 (i).  Y chooses at random u  = 13,v  = 15 and computes w   = 3 and sends w to C. 
                              (ii). C chooses at random  = 8, computes  = 8 and   = 13 and sends ,   to Y. 
                       (iii). Y sends  u , v to C, by which C can verify that w   =  3. 
          (iv). C sends  to Y, by which she can verify that    =  16 and    =   4 .      
3.4. Remarks 
In this section, we have discussed an on-line /off-line directed signature scheme, which is useful in 
that case when the signed message is sensitive to signature receiver. In this scheme, the signature receiver 
C has full control over the signature verification process. Nobody can check the validity of signature 
without his co-operation. The receiver is also able to prove the validity of the signature, whenever 
necessary.  
We have presented a construction of such a directed signature scheme, which is based on discrete 
logarithm problems. Hence the security level of this scheme is similar to that of other scheme based on 
discrete logarithm.  Since the relation between the signer and signer’s secret key is not known to anyone, 
this scheme is more secure than any other scheme, based on the discrete logarithm.  
4. Allocation of registration number       
Registrations of various kinds are a common practice in our society, like that of vehicle, shop and 
factory etc. In daily life, there are so many situations, when it is necessary, beneficial and expedient to 
have a registration number for vehicles etc. 
This section proposes a registration scheme in which the registration number cannot be forged and 
misused. Under this scheme the validity of an allocated registration number can be verified at any time by 
any authority. The allocating authority and verifying authority may be different. For the practical 
implementation of this idea, we use a directed signature scheme. 
We all are familiar with the present status of our registration system. A hand written signature is used 
for the allocation of registration number by the authority. Every signature is followed a lot of formalities 
and records. Unfortunately the present system is not much secure and is liable. 
 We assume a government center, providing the registration number for the public. An officer Yamu , 
Y , heads this center. Y possesses a secret and public key pair (xo ,  yo ). 
 Again consider a public person Chaya, C, with a secret and public key pair (xc , yc) wants her 
registration number. The officer, Y generates a registration number with message m, so that C can directly 
collect her registration number. She can use her registration number publicly. She is able to prove its 
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validity to any authorized party R whenever necessary. No one other than C can use this registration 
number because only she can prove its validity. This section is organized as follows: –  
Allocation of registration number, and verifying processes are as follows. 
4.1.1. Allocation of registration number by Y to C 
(a).  Y picks at random 
1
yK and 2yK  ∈  Zq and computes   
Wy  =   g  1yK - 2yK  mod p   and    Zc      =     yc 1yK  mod p. 
(b). Y again computes  ry  =    h (Zc, Wy, m) and yS   = 2yK −  xo.ry mod q. 
              (c) . Y sends { yS ,Wy , ry, ,m,} to C as her registration number. 
4.1.2. Collecting and verification of registration number by C 
(a). C collects {
yS , Wy , ry,  m} and make this public as her registration number. 
(b). C computes µ   =  [  g yS (  y
0
 
ry  
 
) Wy ]  mod p,  Zc    =     µ Cx  mod p and checks the validity of 
her  registration by computing  ry,   =     h (Zc, Wy, m). 
4.1.3. Verification Of registration number by authority R 
            This part is same in the previous section- 2.3.3. 
4.2. Illustration 
        The following illustration supports our scheme for practical implementation. Taking p  = 23,  q  
= 11 and  g  =  5.The secret and private key of users is as follow 
   For                                 Secret key                         private key 
    Y                               5                          20 
    C                           8                                      16 
4.2.1. Allocation of registration number by Y to C 
(a) Y  picks at random 
1y
K = 7, 
2y
K =  4 and calculate 
             Wy     =   10,   Zy    =    1  and   ry   =      2.  (taking m = 1)   
       (b) Y computes yS  = 5, and sends {10,2,5,1} to C as her registration number. 
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4.2.2. Verification of registration number by C 
 (a).  C collects her registration number {10,2,5,1} and makes this public. 
  (b).   C checks the validity of her registration by computing ZC = 18 and check if ry  =   2.   
4.2.3. Validity proof of registration number by C to any authorized party R 
   (a)  C computes    =   6,  and ZC    =  6 8 mod 23 =   18. and sends (18,10,2,5,1) to R. 
          (b)  R   checks if  ry    =   h (18,10,1)  =     2. 
                  If this does not hold stops the process; otherwise goes to next step. 
    (c)  Now C proves to ‘R’ that log
 618  =  log 5 16, in a zero knowledge fashion by using the 
confirmation protocol. The illustration of this protocol is similar to that of previous in 
section- 3.3.4.  
4.3. Remarks 
Thus above construction facilities the allocation of registration number in the electronic 
world with the following characteristics. 
• Only the user can use his/her registration number, due to the property of directed   
signature scheme. 
• The problems of forgery can be solved easily. 
• By using this scheme, we can minimize the possible misuse of the present system. 
• The obvious advantage of our scheme over present system is that the resulting 
registration number has no meaning to any third person. 
• Since the relation between the signature and the signer secret key is not known to 
anyone but the designated receiver. Hence security level is much higher than any other 
scheme based on discrete logarithm. 
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